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International  emission  trading  is  an  important  ﬂexibility  mech-
anism, but  its  use has been  often  restricted  on  the  ground  that
access  to  international  carbon  credits  can  undermine  the  domestic
abatement  effort  reducing  the incentive  to  innovate  and,  even-
tually,  lowering  the  pace  of  climate  policy-induced  technological
change. This  paper  examines  the  economics  that  is behind  these
concerns  by  studying  how  a  cap to the  trade  of  carbon  offsets  inﬂu-
ences  innovation,  technological  change,  and  welfare.  By  using  a
standard  game  of  abatement  and  R&D,  we  investigate  the  main
mechanisms  that  shape  these  relationships.  We  also  use  a numer-
ical  integrated  assessment  model  that  features  environmental  and
technology  externalities  to  quantify  how  limits  to the volume,  the
timing,  and  the  regional  allocation  of  carbon  offsets  affect  climate
policy  costs  and  the  incentive  to  invest  in innovation  and low-
carbon technologies.
Results  indicate  that, for moderate  caps  on  the  amount  trad-
able  emissions  permits  and  sufﬁciently  high  technology  spillovers,
global  innovation  and  technical  change  would  increase  and  that  this
additional  innovative  effort  could  lead  to economic  efﬁciency  gains.
The  numerical  analysis  conﬁrms  that  when  constraints  are  close
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to  15%  of domestic  abatement,  efﬁciency  losses  are  small  because
they  are  partly  compensated  by  more  technological  spillovers  and
lower energy  prices.  Under  a broad  range  of  parameters,  restrictions
are costly  for  the  constrained  countries,  but  always  beneﬁcial  for
unconstrained  ones.
©  2012  Elsevier  B.V.  All  rights  reserved.
1. Introduction
Since the Kyoto Protocol, the international trade of carbon allowances and credits has been a fun-
damental element to ensure ﬂexibility and cost efﬁciency of climate change policies. International
emission trading has the potential to reduce compliance costs because it allows exploiting low cost
emission reduction options no matter where they are located. Regional and sub-regional carbon mar-
ket initiatives, either regulated or voluntary, have emerged, especially in developed countries.1 The
exchange of carbon allowances and credits, especially at the international level, has also raised some
concerns. If not well-designed, cap-and-trade schemes might undermine the environmental effective-
ness of climate policies, reduce innovation incentives, and ultimately hinder the deployment of clean
technologies. As a matter of fact, the lack of agreement on the implementation procedures of the Kyoto
ﬂexible mechanisms was the cause of the failure of the negotiations in the Hague in 2000. In 2004,
the EU linking directive established the possibility to use the Kyoto credits in the EU-ETS without any
limit. During the second Phase of emission trading, the EU Commissions introduced quantitative and
qualitative restrictions on the use of these offsets2 (de Sépibus, 2008). This revision was  meant to
avoid a price collapse, as observed during the ﬁrst Phase. Another argument was that emission trading
could reduce the incentive to innovate (Hourcade et al., 1999).
When facing the choice between innovate or purchase carbon credits, a polluting country would
select the cheapest option (Driesen, 2003). If permits are cheaper compared to the cost of investing in
mitigation options at Home, the possibility of trading creates an incentive to shift abatement abroad,
reducing total compliance costs, but also lowering the incentive to carry out innovation. Considering
these arguments, most cap-and-trade schemes include ceilings on the use of international carbon
offsets. If limits to purchase credits are not large, economic losses might be modest and therefore
it may  be worthwhile on economic grounds to use them (Karp and Zhao, 2009). These limits could
avoid huge ﬁnancial transfers, make the agreement more appealing for industrialised countries, and
stimulate innovation.
The argument in favour of ceilings might be reinforced in a second-best world. Unrestricted emis-
sion trading always generates efﬁciency gains in a ﬁrst-best world when the only distortion is global
pollution (see for example Weyant and Hill, 1999; Bohm, 1999; Chander et al., 2002; Richels et al.,
2007). However, in a second-best world addressing only one of the various market distortions will
not necessarily improve welfare (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956). Environmental economics suggests that
multiple policy instruments should be employed (Jaffe et al., 2003, 2005; Bennear and Stavins, 2007).
In practice, however, designing several instruments can be complicated, and despite the various forms
of regulation used today, a market-based solution aimed at pricing CO2 is widely regarded (at least
among economists) as the most efﬁcient solution for the case of global warming.
The economic efﬁciency of emission trading in the presence of various externalities has been ana-
lysed mostly using simple analytical models. However, hardly any numerical evaluation has considered
second-best interactions with technology externalities. Most second-best quantitative assessments
have explore the role of pre-existing distortionary taxes (Babiker et al., 2004; Paltsev et al., 2007;
McKibbin et al., 1999). Only Buonanno et al. (2000) assess the pros and cons of introducing ceilings to
emission trading in a model with endogenous technical change (ETC-RICE). They ﬁnd little support for
1 For a review of cap-and-trade schemes around the world see Capoor and Ambrosi (2009).
2 In the paper we  do not distinguish between trade in carbon credits and allowances, which for the purpose of our analysis
are  equivalent. When using the term offsets, we  refer to both of them.
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quantitative restrictions, which have negative impacts on both efﬁciency and equity. Although quan-
titative restrictions foster technological innovation, its long-run positive effects on economic growth
are lower than the additional economic costs. Their model does not include international spillovers of
knowledge and experience and therefore it underestimates the beneﬁts of technological innovation.
A different issue, which however can ultimately have the same effect of reducing the volume of
international carbon trade, relates to the difﬁculties of putting in place a well-functioning international
carbon market. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol, the largest existing
international carbon market, has revealed severe problems concerning monitoring, credit veriﬁcation,
and quality certiﬁcation of projects (Wara and Victor, 2008). As long as these problems are not solved,
institutional and administrative issues will delay the establishment of an international market.
The general question we address in this paper is whether restricting the trade of international
carbon offsets is a second-best policy in the presence of environmental, technology, and economic
externalities. Market failures exist not only in the provision of the international environmental good,
such as emission reduction, but also in markets for innovation and technology diffusion. Climate
policy can induce second-order effects on innovation and technical change, but it is designed to tackle
the environmental externality, not the technology one. For this reason, limiting international emission
trading would lead to welfare losses in a ﬁrst-best world, but this might not be the case in a second-best
world.
The paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we use a standard game of abate-
ment and R&D with two externalities (environmental damage and innovation) and two regions to
evaluate the implications of limiting carbon trading on innovation and welfare. This provides novel
insights on the interplay between innovation and climate policies. Second, we  extend the analysis
using a rich numerical integrated assessment model that features environmental, technology, as well
as carbon leakage through international energy markets. This allows to generate one of the every few
quantitative estimates of the economic implications of trade restrictions on emission permits.
Our results indicate that some restrictions on international trading of emission allowances can be
justiﬁed when the only instrument available to policymakers is that of a carbon market. The analysis
shows that, under plausible assumptions about technical change, permit trading restriction leads to
more global innovation and that, when the limitation is moderate and spillovers sufﬁciently high, the
efﬁciency losses could be small or even negative. Speciﬁcally, when dealing with a climate stabili-
sation policy where developed countries initially take on the largest obligations, limiting access to
international offsets would make abatement more costly globally and for the OECD as a whole, but
the efﬁciency losses are small for moderate trading restrictions. Constraining offsets to at most 15% of
regional abatement, approximately in line with what was proposed in the EU and US, would not affect
welfare in the US, though it would result in a loss for Europe. However, ﬁnancial ﬂows to developing
countries would be signiﬁcantly reduced. Despite the revenue loss on the carbon market, non-OECD
regions would be compensated by lower energy prices and higher technological spillovers, the latter
due to more innovation being carried out in constrained regions (OECD). These results are shown to
be robust to a broad set of parameters regarding the process of technological change and knowledge
spillovers.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the connections between
R&D, spillovers, and permit trade restrictions using a standard model with multiple externalities.
Section 3 introduces a numerical integrated assessment model and extends the analysis to a more
general set-up. Section 4 illustrates the macroeconomic implications of the climate policy under dif-
ferent carbon market designs. Given the critical role of technology externalities, Section 4 explores
the sensitivity of major results to variations in key parameters. Section 5 concludes and adds some
policy considerations.
2. Restricted permit trade and technological change in a standard analytical framework
2.1. Contribution of existing literature
A number of studies have investigated how market failures associated with innovation and the dif-
fusion of technologies affect the optimal environmental policy and the equivalence between different
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market-based instruments such as tax and emission trading. A well-known result is that, when tech-
nology externalities are not internalised, the optimal tax or the permit price should be higher than the
Pigovian level. Golombek and Hoel (2006) analyse the welfare implications of carbon permit trade in a
second-best world where technology externalities are not internalised. They ﬁnd that the second-best
optimum is characterised by marginal costs of abatement exceeding the Pigovian tax in all countries.
A tighter emission requirement is thus a way of compensating for the lack of technology policy. In a
follow-up paper, Golombek and Hoel (2008) ﬁnd that the price of carbon should differ across hetero-
geneous countries in the second-best agreement and they conclude that whether emission trading
is welfare enhancing or not, is an empirical question. Gerlagh et al. (2009),  using a model without
spillovers but with ﬁnite patent lifetime, show that the difference with the Pigovian tax should mimic
the optimal research subsidy or tax. In fact, when the technology externality is not regulated by an
explicit targeted policy, the equilibrium level of innovation tends to be lower than ﬁrst-best (Golombek
and Hoel, 2004, 2005). As recently pointed out by Heal and Tarui (2010),  this conventional wisdom
hinges on the assumed relationship between innovation and cost structure. The crucial assumption
is that technology improvements reduce marginal abatement costs. Baker et al. (2008) discuss how
abatement cost curves can change in many different ways as a result of technical change. Technical
change can actually lead to the adoption of technologies with higher marginal abatement costs com-
pared to the old ones. As example of abatement options with a different cost structure, Heal and Tarui
(2010) discuss the application of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology to coal power genera-
tion. Contrary to renewable sources, which have high ﬁxed costs, but nearly zero variable ones, CCS is
characterised by high variables costs that increase with the CO2 price. Heal and Tarui show that when
technical change leads to the adoption of a technology with this cost structure, the equilibrium R&D
investments might be lower than ﬁrst-best, depending also on the extent of international spillovers.
The existing literature has focussed on the implications of a higher second-best carbon price on
innovation and technological change, but it has not explored the link between restrictions on permit
trade, innovation, and welfare, which is the focus of this paper. We  ask the question whether, in
the presence of multiple externalities, restricting the trade of carbon permits can be a second-best
policy recommendation, and if so, under which conditions. The remaining of this section introduces a
standard simultaneous game of abatement and R&D investments, while the next section generalises
the analysis by using a numerical general equilibrium calibrated model.
2.2. A model of innovation and abatement
Consider a two-region model where each country chooses investments in innovation, x, and abate-
ment, a. Both regions have the same abatement cost, which is an increasing and strictly convex function
in abatement, Ca(X, a) > 0, Caa(X, a) > 0, but decreasing in the level of total knowledge stock X, CX(X,
a) < 0, CXX(X, a) > 0. Innovation investment costs are given by G(x), where Gx > 0, Gxx ≥ 0. The level of
knowledge stock in the Home region depends on the sum of its own  investments (x) and those of
the Foreign region (x¯) : X = x + x¯, where  ∈ [0,1] represents the extent of international technology
spillovers. That is, only a fraction  of the R&D investments carried in the other region is appropriated
domestically. For comparability with the second part of the paper, we  assume that innovation lowers
marginal abatement costs, CaX = CXa < 0. This mechanism is also maintained in the numerical model
used in Section 3, where technical change reduces the costs of capital-intensive technologies with
very low variable costs.3
The ﬁrst-best Pareto level of innovation investments and abatement {xp, ap} minimises the total
social costs, including environmental damage D, which is a function of total emissions (or equivalently
abatement, if we assume exogenous baseline emissions), C(X, a) + G(x) + C(X¯, a¯) + G(x¯) + D(a + a¯). The
ﬁrst order conditions (FOCs) for the Home region are:
x : Cx(Xp, ap) + Cx(X¯p, ap) + Gx(xP) = 0 (1)
a : Ca(Xp, ap) = Da(ap + a¯p) (2)
3 Although the model features coal with CCS, this option is not subject to technology externalities.
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Let us now consider a cost-effective policy that internalises the environmental externality through
an international emission trading scheme, and in which regions behave non-cooperatively on inno-
vation. The second-best level of technology investments and abatement in the case of no constraints
(free trade) on the use of carbon trading, {xFT, aFT}, is obtained by each region minimising their costs,
including the costs of buying (or proﬁts of selling) CO2 permits at the permit price p, and taking the
other regions’ innovation expenditures as given: p(a0 − a) + C(X, a) + G(x). The initial endowment of
abatement is equal to a0 in the Home region and to 1 − a0 in the Foreign one, where total abatement
normalised to 1. This process leads to the FOCs:
x : CX (XFT , aFT ) + Gx(xFT ) = 0 (3)
a : Ca(X¯FT , aFT ) = pFT (4)
If total abatement is set such that the marginal abatement costs p equals marginal damage D′, then
we have that xFT < xp if  > 0, since CX(X, a) is increasing in x. That is, when setting the permit price at the
Pigouvian level, the innovation level in the quota scheme where R&D expenditures are determined in a
non-cooperative manner is less than optimal. To induce the ﬁrst-best level of innovation, the emission
quota and the resulting price need to be made more stringent. This is the standard result highlighted
in Section 2.1.
Since the focus of this paper is the relationship between international permit trade restrictions and
the incentive to invest in innovation when there are international spillovers, we  consider the same
international quota scheme as above, but now add a constraint on the number of emission permits that
can be traded. We  want to understand whether such restrictions can foster more global innovation,
and if so whether they allow reducing the welfare gap between the ﬁrst best and the non-cooperative
solutions. Each region minimises total costs subject to the additional constraint that a minimum level
of abatement  ˛ must be accomplished domestically, aLIM ≥ ˛. Suppose the Home region will have to
abate at least (aLIM = ˛). The FOCs then become:
x : CX (XLIM, aLIM) + Gx(xLIM) = 0 (5)
a : Ca(XLIM, aLIM) −  = pLIM (6)
(aLIM − ˛) = 0 (7)
where  is the multiplier associated with the permit trade limit in the Home region. When the con-
straint is binding (aLIM = ˛), the marginal abatement costs across regions are no longer equal. Marginal
costs in the Home region, Ca(XLIM, ˛) = pLIM + , become larger than those in the Foreign region, where
they equal the permit price, Ca(X¯LIM, a¯LIM) = pLIM . A trade restriction has an ambiguous effect on the
international price of carbon. On the one hand, fewer permits would be traded, leading to a lower inter-
national price. On the other hand, a lower level of innovation in the Foreign country could increase
marginal abatement costs and hence the international price of carbon (see Lemma  1).
The buyer (constrained) Home region will incur in the extra cost of raising the domestic effort above
the efﬁcient level, depending on the stringency of the trade constraint ˛. Replacing a =  ˛ and a¯ = 1 − ˛
in the FOCs for innovation and by totally differentiating them, the effect of making the permit trading
cap more stringent on innovation is immediately obtained.
Lemma  1. In a tradable emission quota system where regions behave non-cooperatively with respect to
the innovation externality, restricting emission permits trading increases R&D investments in the Home
restricted region dx/d˛ > 0 if innovation reduces marginal abatement costs, CaX < 0. Innovation in the Foreign
unrestricted region is non-increasing in the trade restriction,  dx¯/d  ˛ ≤ 0.
Lemma  1 indicates that, as long as innovation lowers marginal abatement costs, CaX < 0, a restriction
on permit trade increases R&D investments in the constrained region. Because the total amount of
abatement is ﬁxed to 1, the other region will reduce abatement and therefore innovation will decrease.
The precise effect also depends on the extent of spillovers. For a given permit trade restriction, the
larger the magnitude of spillovers, the higher the increase in innovation in the Home region and the
reduction in the Foreign one.
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Global innovation will increase if the additional investment in the constrained Home region is
higher than the reduction in the unconstrained Foreign one, (dx/d˛) + (dx¯/d˛) ≥ 0, or equivalently if
the innovation in the constrained region is convex in the level of permit trade restriction. The following
proposition clariﬁes this effect.
Proposition 1.
a. In a tradable emission quota system where regions behave non-cooperatively with respect to the inno-
vation externality, restricting emission permits trading increases global R&D expenditures, (dx/d˛) +
(dx¯/d˛) ≥ 0, if:
−C˛X (X¯LIM, 1 − ˛)
Gxx(x¯LIM) + (1 − )Cxx(X¯LIM, 1 − ˛)
<
−C˛X (XLIM, ˛)
Gxx(xLIM) + (1 − )Cxx(XLIM, ˛)
(i)
b. Total R&D always increases in the corner solution case of zero R&D investments in the unrestricted
Foreign region (x¯ = 0).
Limiting trade affects global welfare through two channels. By not equalising marginal abatement
costs across countries, it generates an efﬁciency loss. By modifying the incentives to invest in R&D, it can
generate innovation beneﬁts. Corollary 1 summarises the trade-off between these two mechanisms.
Corollary 1. For a deviation from the free trade abatement allocation due to the trading restriction, total
costs decrease if:
C˛(X, ˛) − C˛(X¯, 1 − ˛)
CX (X, ˛)
+ CX (X¯, 1 − ˛)
CX (X, ˛)
dx
d˛
+ dx¯
d˛
> 0 (ii)
Conditions (i) and (ii) depend on the speciﬁcation of the abatement and investment cost functions.
The relation between technical change and the marginal cost of emission reduction is particularly
important in condition (i).  If the marginal beneﬁt of innovation increases in abatement, then the
numerator of (i),  −CX˛, would increase in the trade restriction.4 This is the case in which R&D pivots
down the marginal abatement cost curve, thus reducing marginal abatement costs especially for high
level of abatement. For example, think of a R&D programme that leads to the adoption of a break-
through technology with very low variable costs. Even in this case, though, condition (i) would be met
only if CXX and Gxx did not change in the level of trade restriction. For example, a constant Gxx would
imply G to be either linear or quadratic, which is possibly a reasonable assumption. But this might
not apply to CXX Recall in fact that, while innovation costs G depend only on innovation, C depends
on innovation and abatement. Abatement and innovation both increase with the trade restriction,
but their effect on CXX has an opposite sign. Whether total R&D increases in the trade restriction will
depend on the assumed functional forms of the abatement and the R&D cost functions.
Condition (ii) states the requirement for a global welfare gain. Welfare gains can arise if the efﬁ-
ciency loss (ﬁrst term) is compensated by the innovation gain (second term). Let us assume that the
trade restriction is a marginal one from the free trade allocation (e.g., ˛∼=0.5). Then the ﬁrst term in (ii)
is zero. The second term is related to the change in global innovation ((dx/d˛) + (dx¯/d˛)) but with an
additional weight, CX (X¯, 1 − ˛)/CX (X, ˛), which measures the relative return to innovation between
Foreign and Home. In the case of full spillovers ( = 1), this weight is equal to one and then condition
(ii) collapses to condition (i).  That is, for a marginal deviation from free trade and full spillovers, when
total innovation increases, costs decrease. Cost would also decrease in case of a corner solution of
zero foreign investment (x¯ = 0), or if spillovers or return to innovation were sufﬁciently asymmetric
and larger for Foreign than for Home ( < ¯ or CX < CX ). This could indeed hold if we  were to iden-
tify Foreign with developing countries which are distant from the technology frontier, something we
represent in the integrated assessment model used in Section 3.
For  < 1 and symmetric regions, however, CX (X¯, 1 − ˛)/CX (X, ˛) is less than one and condition (i) is
a necessary but not sufﬁcient condition for (ii),  since the innovation beneﬁts in the Foreign region (for
4 Remember that Cax is negative and therefore higher marginal beneﬁts of innovation imply a lower marginal abatement cost.
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Fig. 1. Total R&D expenditures for the case of b = 3 and c = 1, for  ranging from 0 (upper line) to 1 (lower line) with increments
of  0.1. The horizontal axis plots the level of permit trade restriction  ˛ from 0.5 (no restriction) to 1. The vertical axis plots total
innovation. The diamonds show the total level of innovation in the Pareto case, for the corresponding value of  .
a marginal deviation from full trade) are smaller than at Home, due to the incomplete appropriability
of innovation. Moreover, when deviations from free trade are not marginal, the efﬁciency loss due
to the misallocation of abatement (ﬁrst term of (ii))  would no longer be insigniﬁcant. Thus, we can
expect permit trade restriction to lead to welfare gains only for small constraints and sufﬁciently high
spillovers. We  further explore this result in the next section for a given function form of C(X, a).
2.3. A numerical example
Let us assume that abatement cost is a power law function of abatement and innovation, and that
the cost of innovation equals the R&D expenditures:
C(X, a) = ˇa
b
(X + 1)c and G(x) = x
with b and c (greater than 0) controlling the curvature of marginal abatement and innovation. This is
a quite general functional form which is often used in calibrated models.
Solving for the optimal level of innovation for both regions (x, x¯), it is straightforward to show that,
for an interior solution, condition (i) is satisﬁed whenever b/(c + 1) > 1. It is also easily shown that
this inequality is always satisﬁed if we assume C(X, a) to be strictly convex, that is if CXXCaa − C2Xa > 0.
That is, in condition (i),  the strict convexity of C(X, a) ensures that the optimal level of innovation in the
constrained region is also convex in the level of the trade restriction. Thus, the increase in innovation
in the restricted region more than compensates the decrease in the unrestricted one, even when this is
greater than zero. If b/(c + 1) = 1 the responses in the two  regions are equal, and thus total innovation
is constant in the restriction, until the point where x¯  goes to zero.
We pictorially show the impact of permit trade restrictions on total innovation in Fig. 1 (for  ˇ = 100,
b = 3 and c = 1) for different values of the international knowledge spillover parameter,  . The chart
shows that, as expected since b/(c + 1) > 1, total innovation increases in the trade restriction. The
increase is milder for interior solutions than for corner solutions, which are reached depending on the
level of restriction and of knowledge spillover. Since for the chosen set of parameters a corner solution
in which x¯ = 0 is achieved for all levels of spillover, for stringent enough trade caps total innovation
eventually converges to the same value, given in the chart by the lower line. Convergence is faster for
higher spillovers. The magnitude of spillovers is also very important for determining the differences in
the innovation effort between the non-cooperative solutions and the Pareto ones, shown in the chart
by the diamonds. As expected, the unrestricted non-cooperative cases yield global R&D expenditures
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Fig. 2. Total costs for the case of b = 3 and c = 1, for  ranging from 0 (upper line) to 1 (lower line) with increments of 0.1. The
horizontal axis plots the level of permit trade restriction  ˛ from 0.5 (no restriction) to 1. The vertical axis plots total costs. The
diamonds show the total costs in the Pareto case, for the corresponding value of  .
that are always lower than the Pareto ones. This gap depends on the extent of technology spillovers.
The distance between Pareto and non-cooperative innovation is zero when there are no externalities,
 = 0. Fig. 1 represents this case by the upper line and diamond, which in fact are perfectly aligned. As
spillovers increase, the gap between the diamond and the corresponding line increases and it reaches
its maximum when spillovers are full, represented in the chart by the lower line. Trade restrictions, by
fostering more R&D expenditure, help to close the innovation gap with the Pareto solution. As evident
from the chart, if trade is sufﬁciently restricted, total innovation can increase beyond the globally
optimal Pareto level.
As a second relevant question, we ask whether such trade restrictions can be welfare improving.
As discussed in the previous section, restricting the possibility of trading pollution permits would
introduce two sources of inefﬁciency. First, it would shift abatement away from the optimal allocation
ensured by the equalisation of marginal abatement costs. And, it would require additional resources
for R&D expenditure. However, by partly internalising the innovation externality, the trade ceiling
could provide welfare beneﬁts and reduce the welfare gap between the decentralised outcome and
the globally optimal solution.
Fig. 2 reports the total costs for various restrictions and spillovers (and again for  ˇ = 100, b = 3 and
c = 1). One can notice that for high level of spillovers and mild restrictions on permit trading, the total
costs are lower than for the unrestricted case (  ˛ = 0.5). That is, there appear to be cases where permit
trade restrictions are welfare enhancing, and these cases are in line with what stated in condition (ii).
As expected, the costs remain always higher than in the Pareto case (again represented by diamonds),
since trade restriction is not the most efﬁcient way  to internalise the innovation externality. Nonethe-
less, the result is interesting since it points to potential efﬁciency gains induced by the second-best
policy of limiting permit trading.
Summing up, in this section we have shown that for certain assumptions regarding the way tech-
nical change affects marginal abatement cost, restrictions on the amount of tradable emission permits
can increase the total innovation effort. We  have also shown that this increased innovative effort might
lead to potential economic efﬁciency gains, if permit trade restrictions are moderate and spillovers
sufﬁciently high. In the end, the overall effect of restricting trade on the regional and total costs of
the climate policy depends on the parameterisation of the various functions, especially the impacts of
innovation on the performance of abating technology. Albeit difﬁcult to characterise empirically, an
integrated assessment framework is needed to move beyond the limitations of the analysis made in
this section, especially for what regards the role of the dynamics, the representation of the technology
spillovers and technological change, issues of leakage and other potential effects such as the impact on
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international energy markets. To tackle all these issues in a uniﬁed framework, we turn to a calibrated
general equilibrium model. We  ﬁrst introduce the model and the scenario set-up, and then provide
complementary insights to the ones presented in this section.
3. A fully integrated numerical analysis
3.1. Model structure and setup of the numerical assessment
The numerical analysis uses the WITCH model,5 an energy-economy model that features multiple
externalities. A full description of the model can be found in Bosetti et al. (2006, 2009a).  Here we
brieﬂy discuss how the externalities are represented in the model.
WITCH is a dynamic, optimal growth model with a focus on the energy sector and on GHG mitigation
options. It consists of 12 aggregated regions, denoted with n. One of its distinguishing features is
the game-theoretic set-up that allows producing two different solutions. The model can be run in a
cooperative mode which jointly maximises global social welfare and internalises environmental and
economic externalities, generating a ﬁrst-best optimum. In addition, it can provide the decentralised,
or non-cooperative solution, by optimising the welfare of the individual regions, taking as given each
other region’s choice. This is done through an iterative procedure, which is capable of reproducing the
outcome of a non-cooperative, simultaneous, open membership game with full information, and thus
achieve a second-best Nash equilibrium. With this setting, it is possible to explore the consequences
of dealing with different sources of market failure. The model speciﬁcally incorporates the climate
change externality, the technology externality via international knowledge and experience spillovers,
and carbon leakage through international energy markets.
The climate externality is accounted for by a damage function driven by global average temperature,
computed through a simpliﬁed climate module. This paper, though, provides a cost-effective analysis
of a climate policy aimed at stabilising the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at
a given level,6 essentially putting a cap on the cumulative CO2-eq emissions. In the same spirit of the
preceding section, we assume global emission reductions are achieved through an international carbon
market, which is operative from 2020. Following the UNFCCC distinction between industrialised and
developing countries (in the preceding section Home and Foreign region, respectively), OECD are
allocated strict reductions requiring a 90% cut of GHGs by 2050 compared to 2005 levels. Developing
countries (non-OECD) are allowed to increase emissions by 20% which, compared to the model baseline
projections, implies a reduction of almost 50%,7 or of about 24 GtCO2, compared to 22 GtCO2 for the
OECD.
The technology externality,  in WITCH, is modelled via international spillovers of knowledge and
experience across countries (Bosetti et al., 2008). The model includes a number of different low-carbon
mitigation options, tech. In each country, their technology level (xtech,n,t) is described by the global
stock of energy R&D (R&Dtech,n,t), which measures knowledge, and by the cumulative installed capacity
(CCtech,n) which is a proxy of experience or Learning-by-Doing. At each point in time, new ideas add
to the existing R&D stock, which depreciates at the rate ı. The generation of new ideas is described
by the innovation possibility frontier, which is modelled as a Cobb-Douglas combination between
domestic investments (I R&Dtech,n,t), domestic knowledge stock (R&Dtech,n,t), and foreign knowledge
stock (SPILLtech,n,t):
R&Dtech,n,t+1 = R&Dtech,n,t(1 − ı) + I R&D˛tech,n,tR&D
ˇ
tech,n,t
SPILLεtech,n,t (8)
SPILLtech,n,t =
R&Dtech,n,t∑
j ∈ OECDR&Dtech,j,t
(
∑
j ∈ OECD
R&Dtech,j,t − R&Dtech,n,t) (9)
5 See www.witchmodel.org for model description and related papers.
6 Speciﬁcally 530 ppm of CO2-eq, or 3.5 W/m2.
7 Commitment starting dates have also been differentiated between developed and developing regions, with a 10 year-delay
in  non-OECD regions. We  assume that beyond 2050, all regions will cooperate to reach the long-term stabilisation target and
each  region will be allocated emission permits proportionally to the emission share in 2050.
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The spillover term (SPILLtech,n,t) depends on the interaction between the countries’ absorp-
tive capacity, measured by the ratio of the stock of the country to that of the frontier(
R&Dtech,n,t/
∑
j ∈OECDR&Dtech,j,t
)
, and the distance of each region from the technology frontier itself(∑
j ∈OECDR&Dtech,j,t − R&Dtech,n,t
)
. The technology frontier is calculated as the total stock of knowl-
edge in OECD countries. This formulation implies that foreign knowledge can bring some beneﬁts only
if a domestic R&D programme is established. Knowledge spillovers are not completely free, but they
require dedicated investments. In the notation of the model used in the previous section, this case
corresponds to  < 1.8
In contrast, spillovers of experience are completely free within the time frame of the model, which
is of ﬁve years, t = 5. World cumulative installed capacity in technology tech at time t is computed by
adding investments in all regions (Itech,n,t):
CCtech,t+1 =
∑
t
∑
n
Itech,n,t (10)
Global learning implies that investments in each given region equally contribute the formation of
a global stock of experience, which in turn affects investment costs in all regions, as described in Eq.
(11). In the notation of the model used in the previous section, this case corresponds to  = 1. Regarding
the manner technology level (xtech,n,t) impacts the marginal cost of abatement (Cax), the WITCH model
distinguishes between technological change for decarbonising the energy system and for improving
energy efﬁciency.
Decarbonisation occurs because a higher technology level leads to lower investment costs of low-
carbon technologies. This process is described by a so-called two  factor learning curve of this form:
ICtech,n,t
ICtech,n,0
=
(
R&Dtech,n,t−2
R&Dtech,n,0
)−c(
CCtech,t
CCtech,0
)−b
(11)
The two exponents are the Learning-by-Doing (LBD) index (−b) and the Learning-by-Researching
(LBR) index (−c). They deﬁne the speed of learning. More precisely, the learning ratios, deﬁned as one
minus the progress ratio, LBR ratio = 1 − 2−c; LBD ratio = 1 − 2−b, determine the rate at which invest-
ment costs decline each time the cumulative capacity or the knowledge stock doubles. A two time
period (corresponding to 10 years) lag is assumed for R&D, to capture the inertia of bringing research
to the market. Since the technologies that are subject to learning are assumed to be of renewable type,
the investment costs coincide with the marginal costs. In this formulation technical change reduces the
marginal cost of abatement, as in the model presented in Section 2, where the role of this assumption
was discussed.
Energy efﬁciency is modelled through improvements in the productivity of the energy input (ENn,t)
in the production of the ﬁnal good sector. The energy knowledge stock (R&DEE,n,t) augments the quan-
tity of ﬁnal energy services (ESn,t) that can be provided of each given unit of physical energy (ENn,t)
according to a constant elasticity of substitution production function:
ESn,t =
⌊
a1R&D

EE,n,t + a2EN

n,t
⌋1/
(12)
Finally, the last channel of interaction across regions is that of the international energy and carbon
market. International prices of fossil fuels and CO2 are determined by the equilibrium of demand and
supply at the global level. Thus, different domestic abatement goals as a result of constraints on the
amount of carbon trading can have an impact on the price and trade of such goods.
The structure of this numerical model allows us to consider the most salient features of the cli-
mate mitigation policy, and to do so in a second-best setting. Although this model provides a much
richer framework than analytical ones and represents a step-up over standard integrated assessment
modelling that normally features only the climate externality, it must nonetheless be recognised that
it does not thoroughly represent a second-best world. For example, no international trade of capital
8 With the parameter  we generally denotes the extent of spillovers, following the notation used in Section 2. In WITCH this
parameter takes the value of ε in the case of knowledge spillovers and 1 in the case of experience spillovers.
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Table 1
Global and regional macroeconomic costs of climate stabilisation policy under the “full trade hypothesis.” Consumption losses
discounted at 3% discount rate, 2005–2100.
Consumption OECD Non-OECD World
2005 US$ Trillion 26.19 1.88 28.07
Percentage of BaU consumption 1.68% 0.18% 1.07%
Losses are gross of climate change damages. Negative numbers indicate gains.
Table 2
International carbon market under full trade.
Mkt  size
(GtCO2-eq)
GtCO2-eq
abated
Internationally
traded abatement
Carbon price
(2005
US$/tCO2)
Mkt  value
(2005 US$
Billion)
Mkt  value
(% of GWP)
2020 2.8 7 41% 4 11 0.02%
2025 3.0 14 22% 26 76 0.10%
2030  3.3 20 16% 58 193 0.22%
2050  7.1 46 16% 319 2260 1.74%
is assumed and pre-existing distortionary taxes and subsidies are not accounted for in this exercise.
Our model captures market failures related to international spillovers only in the energy sector, as
no general purpose R&D is assumed. No learning is considered for known, yet potentially improvable
technologies, such as nuclear power and carbon capture and storage (CCS). Thus, this exercise provides
an account of only some of the most relevant sources of global interaction.
3.2. Climate policy under full international carbon trading
We begin by evaluating the implications of a cost-effective policy implemented through an inter-
national quota scheme in the case of no constraints on the use of carbon trading (full trade).9 As
shown in Table 1, given the regional abatement commitments, OECD countries face the highest costs
non-OECD countries slightly gain until mid  century, mostly due to permit revenues, but lose in the
long-term.
The 1% global ﬁgure lies within the range reported in the literature (see for example, IPCC, 2007;
Luderer et al., 2009). Low costs are due to the scenario design, the assumption of immediate partici-
pation and of full ﬂexibility among greenhouse gases abatement options. Departure from any of these
assumptions increases costs substantially (Bosetti et al., 2009b; Clarke et al., 2009).
Without any restriction, countries rely on the international carbon market, and this suggests that it
is an important element of economic ﬂexibility. Table 2 shows the evolution of the carbon market over
time. The initially low carbon price (due to the assumption of global participation and wide basket
of GHGs) is such that the market value is contained at the outset, but grows signiﬁcantly over time,
driven by the convex path of the carbon price. The market size is already signiﬁcant in 2020, when
almost 3 Billion tonnes of CO2 (equal to roughly half of today’s emissions in the US) are exchanged
internationally, enough to require the establishment of considerable institutional and monitoring
capacity.
However, a perfectly functioning international carbon market is not likely be available in 2020.
Recent negotiations have shown that issues of monitoring and veriﬁcation are quite complex to be dealt
with at the international level. The lack of institutional capacity, reliable monitoring, and veriﬁcation
systems in some countries might delay or fragment the establishment of a global market. Or, countries
that have already implemented emission trading schemes, such as the EU, might limit the amount of
international credits that can be used in the domestic trading scheme. The consequences of these three
possible outcomes are described in the next section.
9 Full cooperation is assumed to be supported by a fully ﬂedged, perfectly functioning, international carbon market, which is
operative from 2020 onward.
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Table  3
Regional macroeconomic losses of climate policy when the use of international offsets is delayed (“when” dimension). Con-
sumption losses discounted at 3% discount rate, 2005–2100.
OECD Non-OECD World
Full offsets 1.68% 0.18% 1.07%
From  2030 1.81% 0.11% 1.12%
From  2035 1.90% 0.08% 1.17%
From  2040 2.26% 0.05% 1.37%
From  2045 2.70% 0.08% 1.64%
Negative entries indicate consumption gains.
3.3. Delayed, fragmented, and constrained international carbon trade
Following the above arguments, let us assume that the establishment of an international carbon
market is delayed to a future date between 2030 and 2045 (we name this the “when” scenario). Table 3
reports consumption losses when access to international offsets is delayed over time by 10, 15, 20, or
25 years. Postponing the establishment of an international carbon market increases global macroe-
conomic costs moderately for delays until 2030–2035, but waiting until 2045 raises the policy bill by
about 50%. This is driven by additional losses in OECD regions. Instead, in non-OECD the (moderate)
consumption costs are halved, reducing the global penalty. Welfare improvements in these regions
are a second-best result, driven by positive technology spillovers and lower energy prices. They also
depend on the assumption that non-OECD countries commit to milder emission reduction objectives
compared to OECD.
When trade is restricted, more expensive mitigation options are adopted, driving up compliance
costs.10 With limited access to international offsets, OECD regions further decrease their demand of
all fossil fuels (traditional gas, coal, and oil), oil in particular. The reduced use of oil in OECD countries
lowers its international price, beneﬁting non-OECD regions. This effect is also known as energy market
effect, which is one of the possible sources of carbon leakage. A second channel that is not discussed
in this paper works through changes in terms-of-trade and international competitiveness of energy-
intensive industries.11 The contraction of oil demand in OECD countries is only partially offset by
carbon leakage in non-OECD, which increases the oil demand by 11% (on average) between 2020 and
2040. Fig. 3, upper panel, shows that in the extreme case of a 2045 delay, these two effects result in a
global demand cutback of 16% in 2040. The international price is almost 4% lower compared to the full
trade case. It should be mentioned that most of the oil price reduction occurs when implementing a
stabilisation policy, already in the free trade scenario, where the oil price falls by about 30% in 2050 and
70% in 2010 compared to the baseline. For this reason, the additional price reduction due to restricted
emission trade is relatively contained.
A second response to the trade restriction is to invest more in clean R&D and carbon free power gen-
eration technologies. This ﬁnding generalises the result in Proposition 1. As long as technical change
reduces marginal abatement costs, permit trade limits stimulate investments in technologies subject
to technological change. Let us consider, for example, the dynamics of investments in renewable elec-
tricity, whose marginal cost decreases with the global cumulative capacity, as described in Eq. (11). The
global path of investments in wind and solar are depicted in Fig. 3, bottom panel. During the transition
period without permit trading (2020–2040), OECD investments in wind and solar are raised to match
the more stringent abatement target (∂x/∂  ˛ > 0). Investments in non-OECD initially remain at levels
comparable or slightly lower than the full trade case, but eventually increase as well. This pattern is
due to the reduction in global investment costs caused by additional investment effort in the OECD.
Investments drop below the full trade case only in 2040, in anticipation of the opening to international
10 We  analyse these results for the most stringent case in which trade starts in 2045. The other cases have similar, but smaller
magnitude effects.
11 Burniaux and Oliveira-Martins (2000) assessed the relative contribution of each of the two channels and concluded that
the  non-energy market effect is less important than expected.
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Fig. 3. International oil market (left panel) and renewable electricity (right panel) when delaying the use of international offsets
to  2045.
offsets in 2045, but they remain higher thereafter. The additional investment cost reduction for wind
and solar induced by the trade restriction decreases over time because of the decreasing marginal
beneﬁts of investments, but nonetheless remains positive throughout the century. Such path depen-
dencies help lower the climate policy costs in the long-term, but require an additional effort in the
beginning, which is mostly faced by developed countries. A similar result is observed for investments
in energy R&D, which globally increase throughout the century, but by a larger magnitude during
the transition period without emission trading. The global increase is mostly driven by additional
investments in OECD countries. Non-OECD countries slightly reduce their R&D effort in the short-
run, but increase it after 2035. Since both knowledge stock and new installed capacity in low-carbon
technologies generate international positive spillovers, OECD additional investments reduce marginal
abatement costs in all other regions as well. In other words, the additional costs paid by OECD regions
lead to additional beneﬁts in non-OECD.
Another situation that could arise is a fragmented international carbon market, at least during
the transition towards more consolidated procedures. As noted by Frankel (2008),  it could be that
the eligibility to sell permits is restricted to countries with good international governance ratings, or
that have committed to invest the revenue in green projects, or that have demonstrated ability to
abide to commitments. We  analyse the implications of delaying the participation of three groups of
developing regions that in the global carbon market would play the role of net sellers: Energy Exporting
Regions (EEX: Middle East and North Africa and Russia), Developing Asia (DA: China and India) and
Rest of World (ROW: Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa). In this scenario, an international market
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Table  4
Regional macroeconomic losses of climate stabilisation policy when selected regions join cap-and-trade in 2045 (“where”
dimension). Consumption losses discounted at 3% discount rate, 2005–2100.
OECD Non-OECD World
Full offsets 1.68% 0.18% 1.07%
DA  join in 2045 1.82% 0.12% 1.14%
ROW  join in 2045 1.73% 0.16% 1.10%
EEX  join in 2045 1.73% 0.17% 1.10%
Negative entries indicate consumption gains.
Table 5
Regional macroeconomic losses of climate stabilisation policy when limiting the use of international offsets until 2045 (“how
much” dimension). Consumption losses discounted at 3% discount rate, 2005–2100.
OECD Non-OECD World
Full offsets 1.68% 0.18% 1.07%
20% 1.76% 0.14% 1.11%
15% 1.84% 0.12% 1.15%
10% 1.97% 0.11% 1.22%
0%  2.70% 0.08% 1.64%
Negative entries indicate consumption gains.
is assumed to already exist in 2020, but the above regions join in 2045 (we  named this the “where”
scenario).
Excluding either region from the international carbon market has limited effects on global macro-
economic costs (Table 4), essentially because the others compensate the absence of a seller by
increasing supply. The only case that leads to a visible additional global penalty is the exclusion of
Developing Asia, which covers more than 50% of the demand of permits. For example, the price of
carbon in 2025 would double if Developing Asia were not included in the market, whereas it would
increase by only a few percentage points if other regions were to delay. This result stems from the fact
that emerging economies such as China and India are assumed to host the largest base of mitigation
opportunities. It also reinforces the known argument that any climate policy has to look East to be
effective.
Section 3.2 has shown how rapid the expansion of the carbon market could be (see Table 2). It could
actually mobilise huge ﬁnancial resources. We  ﬁnd that the net outﬂows from the OECD regions to
developing countries could increase up to US$ 1.7 Trillion in 2050, more than 2% of OECD GDP in that
year. Therefore, OECD countries face a trade-off. On the one hand, laissez fair would maximise cost-
effectiveness and contain economic costs. On the other hand, it would entail substantial ﬁnancial ﬂows,
which may  undermine the willingness of industrialised countries to commit. If the climate externality
were the only distortion in the economy, restrictions to carbon trade would create a wedge in marginal
abatement costs across countries, reducing economic efﬁciency. However, since there are technology
externalities, restricting trade might be a second-best policy recommendation.
The remainder of the section explores this case. We  assume that an international carbon market
is already established in 2020, but quantitative restrictions on the use of international carbon credits
are enforced (we name this the “how much” scenario). Until 2045, only a fraction of abatement from
20, 15, 10, 0% of regional abatement, can be met through the international carbon market. The 0% case
coincides with the scenario in which trade is postponed to 2045 (the “2045” case considered above).
The stylised analysis in Section 2 already points out that restricting trade tends to cause global efﬁ-
ciency losses, unless the restriction is mild and spillovers are sufﬁciently high (see Fig. 2 and Corollary
1). Table 5 conﬁrms that, when only a fraction of total abatement in each region can be met  with
international offsets, global consumption losses increase. A mild restriction such as 20% creates costs
that are comparable to postponing trade to 2030 (1.12% consumption loss). Tighter restrictions (10%)
have costs comparable to postponing trade to at least 2035 (1.17% consumption loss).
The dynamics of regional costs depends not only on the interactions between the effects outlined
before (energy market and technology spillovers), but also on the trading position of each region. In
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Fig. 4. Marginal cost of carbon in Europe and US for a 15% limit on international offsets until 2045, and global carbon price
when the market is not restricted (Global).
the short-term, net sellers (non-OECD) tend to lose because of the contraction of the market and, as
a consequence, of the carbon price. The non-OECD regions supply is rationed and therefore they emit
more. However, they anticipate that after 2045 there will be a lager demand of permits and therefore
they still keep emissions below the initial allocation. Throughout the century, limiting trade to 10% of
regional abatement increases non-OECD welfare by about 40% because revenue losses on the carbon
market are offset by the energy market effects and technology spillovers.
The effect on net buyers (OECD) depends on whether the limit is binding or not. When the limit is
binding, the region loses because more expensive abatement options have to substitute for imported
credits. If the limit is not binding, the region gains because carbon permits are cheaper, pLIM < pFT.
Without any ceiling, and given this allowances distribution, developed countries would ﬁnd it optimal
to buy between 18 and 54% of their abatement on the international market. This implies that a mild
restriction of 20% is binding for most developed countries, especially in the short-run and in Europe.
Only the United States is right at the limit, and in 2030 the 20% restriction is not binding.12 As a
consequence, because equivalent offset restrictions lead to relatively more abatement in Europe and
other OECD countries, more R&D and clean investments are induced outside the US. A 15% limit on
trade would raise the cost of carbon signiﬁcantly more in Europe than in the US, as shown in Fig. 4.
In the US, the 15% restriction is binding, but spillovers and the energy market effects compensate the
additional costs, leading to short-term welfare gains and only to a 1% long-term additional penalty. As
a consequence, the US would have economic beneﬁts from imposing a slightly higher carbon tax and
relying less on international offsets, provided Europe and the rest of OECD would also be willing to
adopt equally stringent (but with a higher impact on marginal costs of abatement) measures. This last
condition is important because the US would proﬁt from the reduction in oil prices and in investment
costs of low-carbon technologies induced by the tighter commitment in the rest of OECD, too.
Further analysis13 indicates that the technology spillover effect is somewhat larger than the energy
market effect, though in both cases the efﬁciency losses are small compared to the overall policy
costs shown in Table 2 by a few percentage points. The reason for this is that the stringent climate
stabilisation policy considered in this paper requires a drastic switch of the energy system from a fossil
fuel based to a low-carbon one even in the case with full access to international offsets. This limits the
additional room for reduction in the prices of energy and low carbon fuels when trade is constrained.
12 It is interesting to note that Buonanno et al. (2000),  in the different policy setting of the Kyoto Protocol and with a different
model without international technology spillovers found a similar result for the US.
13 We quantify the contribution of the energy market effect and technology spillovers, by considering three variations of the
15%  scenario in which either or both effects are switched off. Speciﬁcally, we  ran three additional simulations of the 15% trade
restriction case in which we ﬁxed the costs of either fossil fuels or low-carbon technologies characterised by spillovers to the
values of the full trade policy scenario.
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The technology spillovers channel is found to be higher in OECD regions. Despite being closer to the
technology frontier, developed countries have to comply with a very stringent domestic commitment
(especially when trade is limited) that requires fast and major investments in low-carbon mitigation
options, such as wind and solar. Thus, the gains of equal reduction of investment costs in renew-
ables (given by the assumption of global learning by doing) beneﬁts developed countries more than
developing ones. On the contrary, the energy market effect is larger for non-OECD countries, which
are confronted with less demanding mitigation obligations and can procrastinate the consumption of
fossil fuels.
4. Sensitivity analysis
The numerical analysis described in the previous section has shown that, when there are inefﬁcien-
cies in other markets, limiting permit trade can increase global innovation and technological change,
leading to potential efﬁciency gains. Welfare effects tend to be negative in buyer regions (OECD), but
positive in non-OECD (see for example Table 5), because of lower oil prices and higher technologi-
cal spillovers, the latter induced by the more innovation being carried out in the OECD regions. The
results presented in Section 3.2 extend the validity of condition (i) and (ii) to a more generic framework
characterised by multiple externalities and different abatement options.
In this remaining section we test whether the numerical results are idiosyncratic due to speciﬁc
parameter choices by varying the most relevant calibrated inputs. We  focus the sensitivity analysis on
the extent of international knowledge spillovers (the parameter ε in Eq. (8))  and the impact of inno-
vation and experience on the performance of abating technologies (the LBR and LBD indices denoted
with the parameters c and b in Eq. (11)). These two  parameters are key because they affect the extent
to which knowledge and experience reduce marginal abatement costs, in our notation Cax.
It is important to stress the different role of the extent of spillovers and the learning rates. Spillovers
of experience are free, or using the notation of Section 2,  is 1. Learning is assumed to be a global
process that reduces technology costs anywhere in the world, no matter where investments occur. We
assume there are no barriers to the diffusion of new technologies which, once commercialised, can be
adopted within the time frame of ﬁve years. In contrast, knowledge spillovers require R&D capacity
at Home and, using the notation of Section 2,  is less than 1. In the sensitivity analysis we  vary the
extent of international spillovers of knowledge (the value of ε in Eq. (8)), but not that of experience
spillovers. For what concerns the role of experience, we  explored the impact of different degree of
learning.
The empirical evidence that guides the selection of the parameter values for international spillovers
of knowledge is scarce, although an increasing number of papers support their existence (starting
from Grossman and Helpman, 1991, to the more recent contributions of Keller, 2004 and Verdolini
and Galeotti, 2009). In addition, several studies support the hypothesis that domestic R&D effort is
needed to absorb international knowledge (starting from Schmookler, 1966 to the more recent works
by Keller, 2004; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2008; Seres et al., 2009; Verdolini and Galeotti, 2009). As a
central value in the model, we assume a low enough value compared to the contribution of domestic
investments and past knowledge stock, ε = 0.15. To account for diminishing returns, the sum of the
elasticities of the three inputs in Eq. (8) is less than one. The sensitivity analysis on ε covers a sufﬁciently
large spectrum of values, from 0.075 (−50%) to 0.22 (+0.50%). The latter is a considerably high value,
implying a contribution larger than that of domestic investments (0.18) and half that of the past
knowledge stock (0.53).
The learning ratios in Eq. (11) describe the effectiveness of innovation preceding the breakthrough
(Learning-by-Researching, c) and of experience following the adoption of the technology (Learning-
by-Doing, b) at reducing the marginal cost of the abating option. Learning-by-Doing is global ( = 1)
whereas Learning-by-Researching is mostly driven by domestic R&D investments because the con-
tribution of the international pool of knowledge is only 0.15. The empirical evidence on learning
(by-Doing) rates spans relatively wide ranges. On average, the costs of energy supply technolo-
gies decline at rates of 16 ± 9% with each doubling in cumulative production (Weiss et al., 2010).
The value chosen in WITCH is lower than those typically estimated in single factor experience
curves since technological progress results in part from dedicated R&D investments. The literature on
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Table 6
Key parameter values and sensitivity analysis. Learning ratios (LBR and LBD) and contribution of spillovers to knowledge
production (ε).
Central [−50% to +50%] Literature
LBR (parameter c in Eq. (11)) 0.13 0.13a
[0.07–0.19] [0.07–0.19]
[LBRm50–LBRp50]
LBD  (parameter b in Eq. (11)) 0.1/0.14 0.16b
[0.05–0.14]/[0.07–0.20] [0.03–0.25]
[LBDm50–LBDp50]
International knowledge spillovers SPILL (parameter ε in Eq. (8)) 0.15
[0.075–0.225]
[SPILLm50–SPILLp50]
a Various sources. For speciﬁc references see Bosetti et al. (2009a).
b Weiss et al. (2010).
Learning-by-Researching points at an average learning rate of 13%. Table 6 summarises the central
values chosen in the model along with the range explored in the sensitivity analysis, which covers the
values reported in the literature (last column).
The robustness of our numerical results to these key parameters is tested by simulating a number
of additional scenarios in which LBR, LBD, and SPILL are perturbed to the value indicated in Table 6.
We also analyse the extreme cases in which technological externalities are excluded. We  consider the
four ceilings on trade examined in Section 3.2,  namely 0, 10, 15, and 20%. It should be recalled that
these limits are removed after 2045, when full trade is allowed.
Fig. 5 shows the relationship between investments in innovation and clean energy technologies
and permit trade restrictions. It conﬁrms the pattern obtained with the simpler numerical model, in
Fig. 1. Limiting trade increases R&D and investments in technologies subject to technological progress,
for all the parameterisations considered. For trade restrictions between 20 and 15%, varying knowl-
edge spillovers has mild impacts on innovation investments and all markers are clustered around the
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referred to the web version of the article.)
central value case (yellow diamond). For the stricter limit of 0%, the chart shows that larger incre-
ments in investments occur when the extent of spillovers is increased (green stars). When the extent
of spillovers is lower compared to the central case, technology investments still increase, but by a less
amount. This is shown by the pink stars located below the yellow diamonds (central case). Limiting
trade always stimulates global investments in technological change. Identifying under what condi-
tions the highest increment occurs is complicated by the presence of several technology channels as
well as the other mechanisms, namely the international market of carbon allowances and of fossil
fuels.
Regional and global welfare analysis is illustrated in Fig. 6, which shows the economic efﬁciency
gains from limited trade. More precisely, it shows consumption changes in discounted US$ Trillion
compared to the free trade regime, for various carbon trade restrictions. Positive numbers are gains,
indicating that consumption with restricted trade is higher than with free trade. The values on the
axes are consumption changes for OECD (y-axis) and non-OECD (x axis). To give a sense of magnitude,
global policy costs under free trade amount to a consumption loss of 28 US$ Trillion (of which 1.88
in non-OECD, see Table 2). The chart depicts two different hypothetical worlds. In the lower left
quadrant, a world without technology externalities is shown. In the lower right quadrant, different
parameterisations of the three technology mechanisms included in the model are presented. Efﬁciency
gains vary with ranging trade limits (vertically, from the top markers which represent the 20% limit
to the bottom markers, the 0% limit) and over the space of different parameterisations (horizontally,
from the cases of no externalities in the left quadrant to cases with different parameterisation of
externalities on the right).
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In the absence of technology externalities, limiting the trade of emission permits worsens the
welfare in both regions (left quadrant). The chart represents this by the two  sets of markers named
w/o LBD, LBR, SPILL and w/o LBD and LBR. These two  cases illustrate the hypothetical situation in
which technological change is frozen14 and the only manner to reduce marginal abatement costs is by
improving energy efﬁciency. When international spillovers are excluded (w/o LBD, LBR, SPILL), energy
efﬁciency can only be increased by domestic R&D investments. When spillovers are included (w/o LBD
and LBR case), R&D investments in each given region affect energy efﬁciency in other regions as well, as
described in Eq. (9).  Thus, the difference between these two  sets of markers gives an indication of the
welfare effect associated with the unintended diffusion of knowledge. In the presence of technology
externalities, limiting permit trade always brings efﬁciency gains to non-OECD countries, but induces
efﬁciency losses to OECD ones (Fig. 6, right quadrant). This holds for a broad enough range of parameter
values.
Global welfare are always higher under the free trade regime, suggesting that the technology pos-
itive externality is not enough to outweigh the additional costs of innovation and the efﬁciency loss
due to non equalised marginal abatement costs. However, the numerical analysis in Section 2.3 points
at cases in which global gains are possible, especially when trade restrictions are mild. Fig. 6 shows
that, when the ceiling is 20%, the LBDm40 and LBDm50 cases are characterised by global welfare gains.
This result is the combination of a number of elements. First, the 20% limit is binding only for Europe
whereas other OECD countries, namely the US, gain because carbon permits are cheaper. This situation
also creates an incentive to anticipate innovation in China and Latina America, which are the major
sellers on the carbon market. In addition, low LBD rates are compensated for by a larger innovation
effort. When the efﬁcacy of experience to reduce technology costs is low, as in the cases LBDm#, more
R&D expenditure is needed to complement the (weaker) effect of learning. In fact, when LBD rates are
low trade limits increase breakthrough R&D even more.
Fig. 6 also highlights that the magnitude of welfare effects varies with the nature of the exter-
nality considered and the extent of spillovers. The largest improvements in non-OECD arise when
learning through experience is more effective at reducing marginal abatement costs (the green tri-
angle markers denoted with LBDp#). Higher LBD rates imply that the marginal beneﬁt of a given
increase in global installed capacity is larger. Higher LBR rates have a very similar effect, but the inﬂu-
ence on welfare is smaller because the extent of knowledge spillovers is less than that of experience
spillovers. Varying the degree of R&D spillovers is associated with limited welfare effects because
of the partial appropriability of knowledge. In addition, this perturbation changes only the degree
of international knowledge diffusion (ε), but it does not modify the impact on the costs of abating
technologies (Cax).
All in all, policy costs vary signiﬁcantly across different speciﬁcations. If we consider the two
extreme cases with high and low LBD rates, global consumption costs under free trade almost double,
from 0.79% to 1.56%, an absolute difference of about 20 US$ Trillion (9 US$ Trillion in non-OECD).
Excluding induced technical change (w/o LBD, LBR, SPILL) would increase global costs to 3.5%. Despite
these differences, the effect of less trade on innovation and welfare is robust across different param-
eterisations.
5. Some concluding remarks and policy considerations
This paper explores the relationship between trade of carbon allowances, the incentive to inno-
vate, technology dynamics, and economic efﬁciency when multiple externalities are simultaneously
considered. Using a standard model, we identify the conditions under which restrictions on emission
permit trading increase global innovation and welfare. We  then generalise the analysis using a numer-
ical integrated assessment model that features multiple externalities and endogenous technological
change.
Results indicate that mild restrictions to the international trading of emission allowances can be
justiﬁed when emission trading is the only instrument available to policymakers and regions act
14 More precisely we assume that neither LBD nor LBR can affect marginal abatement costs.
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Fig. 7. Carbon market and global macroeconomic costs. Consumption losses discounted at 3% discount rate.
non-cooperatively on innovation. For certain assumptions regarding the way technical change affects
marginal abatement cost, restrictions on the amount of tradable emission permits can increase global
innovation and technical change, leading to economic efﬁciency gains. The second part of the paper
considers a global stabilisation policy in which the developed OECD countries take on the largest
obligations in terms of emission reduction and, as a consequence, are the major buyers on the inter-
national carbon market. The numerical analysis shows that limiting the access to international carbon
credits would make abatement more costly globally and for the OECD as a whole. However, efﬁciency
losses are small for moderate restrictions that limit the use of international offsets to at most 15%
of domestic regional abatement. International ﬁnancial transfer would be signiﬁcantly reduced and
more innovative activity would be undertaken. In non-OECD regions, the revenue losses on the carbon
market would be compensated by lower energy prices and higher technological spillovers. The latter
is due to more innovation being carried out in constrained OECD regions.
Extensive sensitivity analysis on the key parameters controlling the rate of technological change
and spillovers generalises the validity of these results. For the whole spectrum of parameter val-
ues analysed, limiting permit trade always brings efﬁciency gains to non-OECD countries, provided
there are technology externalities. In fact, when these are excluded, both developed and developing
countries would be harmed by the barriers to emission trading.
Fig. 7 summarises the relationship between the size of carbon market and the global economic
costs of the climate policy. When moving from the full trade regime to the limiting case of no permit
trade until 2045, the costs of the climate policy increases quite signiﬁcantly, by about 50%. How-
ever, the relation between trade limits and policy costs is quite ﬂat for moderate restrictions. A
limit of 15% (85% of abatement must be achieved domestically) would be comparable to postpon-
ing trade between 2030 and 2035 or to exclude the larger seller from trade. This would result in
a slight global efﬁciency loss. Almost all penalties that arise from trade restrictions are paid by the
developed countries, since developing countries are compensated by the positive externalities of tech-
nological change and energy market effects. After examining the effects on macroeconomic costs,
ﬁnancial ﬂows, and innovation, we can conclude that a moderate quantitative limit to the use of inter-
national offsets, such as the 15% proposed in Europe and in the US, might be a second-best policy
recommendation.
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Appendix A.
Proof of Lemma  1. Replacing the trade limit in the ﬁrst order conditions of the Home and Foreign
regions, a = ˛ and a¯ = 1 − ˛, we obtain:
Home region
x : CX (XLIM, ˛) + Gx(xLIM) = 0 (a1)
a : Ca(XLIM, ˛) −  = pLIM (a2)
Foreign region
x : Cx(X¯LIM, 1 − ˛) + Gx(x¯LIM) = 0 (a3)
a : Ca(X¯LIM, 1 − ˛) = pLIM (a4)
By totally differentiating the FOCs for innovation – Eqs. (a1) and (a3) – we  immediately obtain
the effect of tightening the trade permit limit on innovation. To simplify the notation we  drop the
argument of the cost functions and denote the Foreign region with a bar over the cost functions,
CXX = CXX (X¯LIM, 1 − ˛), Gxx = Gxx(x¯LIM) and CX˛ = CX˛(X¯LIM, 1 − ˛).15 Using this notation we  obtain:
[
CXX + Gxx CXX
CXX CXX + Gxx
]⎡⎢⎢⎣
dx
d˛
dx¯
d˛
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ =
[
−CX˛
CX˛
]
Applying Cramer’s rule, it can be shown that innovation in the Home region increases with the
trade limit:
dx
d˛
= −CX˛(CXX + Gxx) − CXXCX˛
(CXX + Gxx)(CXX + Gxx) − (CXX )(CXX )
> 0 (a5)
because CX˛ < 0, CX˛ < 0, CXX(x, a) > 0 and Gxx ≥ 0, −CX˛(CXX + Gxx) − CXXCX˛ ≥ 0. The denominator
is always positive because  ≤ 0, and thus (CXX + Gxx)(CXX + Gxx) > (CXX )(CXX ).
Because the total amount of abatement is given, the other region will reduce his abatement effort
and therefore innovation will decrease according to a similar expression:
dx¯
d˛
= (CXX + Gxx)CX˛ − (−CX˛)CXX
(CXX + Gxx)(CXX + Gxx) − (CXX )(CXX )
< 0 (a6)
because CX˛ < 0, CX˛ < 0, CXX(x, a) > 0 and Gxx ≥ 0, hence (CXX + Gxx)CX˛ + (CX˛)CXX < 0.
Proof of Proposition 1a.  Using conditions (a5) and (a6) total innovation is given by the following
expression:
dx
d˛
+ dx¯
d˛
= −CX˛(CXX + Gxx) − CXXCX˛
(CXX + Gxx)(CXX + Gxx) − (CXX )(CXX )
+ (CXX + Gxx)CX˛ − (−CX˛)CXX
(CXX + Gxx)(CXX + Gxx) − (CXX )(CXX )
Let us deﬁne  = (CXX + Gxx)(CXX + Gxx) − (CXX )(CXX ), where  > 0
dx
d˛
+ dx¯
d˛
= 1

([GxxCX˛ − CX˛Gxx] + [CXXCX˛ − CX˛CXX ] − [CXXCX˛ − CX˛CXX ])
It follows that total innovation increases
dx
d˛
+ dx¯
d˛
> 0
15 Note also the change in notation from CX˛ to CXa to emphasise that we  consider marginal variations in the trade restriction,
thus  CXa = (∂2C(X¯, a¯)/∂X¯∂a¯)
∣∣X¯ = x¯ + x1a¯ = 1 − ˛∣∣.
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if[GxxCX˛ − CX˛Gxx] + [CxxCX˛ − CX˛CXX ] − [CXXCX˛ − CX˛CXX ] > 0
Rearranging we obtain:
−C˛X (X¯LIM, 1 − ˛)
Gxx(x¯LIM) + (1 − )Cxx(X¯LIM, 1 − ˛)
<
−C˛X (XLIM, ˛)
Gxx(xLIM) + (1 − )Cxx(XLIM, ˛)
(a7)

Proof of Proposition 1b.  In the corner solution case of zero R&D investments in the unrestricted
Foreign region dx¯/d  ˛ = 0. Hence the marginal effect on total innovation coincides with the marginal
effect on innovation in the Home country, (dx/d˛) + (dx¯/d˛) = dx/d˛,  which is always positive by Eq.
(a5).
Proof of Corollary 1. Deﬁne total costs of innovation and abatement as:
T(a) = C(X, a) + G(x) + C(X¯, 1 − a) + G(x¯)
Differentiating:
(CX (X, a) + Gx(x))
dx
d˛
+ (CX (X¯, 1 − ˛) + Gx(x¯))
dx¯
da
+ (Ca(X, a) − Ca(X¯, 1 − a))
+ dx
da
CX (X¯, 1 − a) +
dx¯
da
CX (X, a)
Using the FOCs (a1) and (a3) the expression can be simpliﬁed as follows:
(Ca(X, a) − Ca(X¯, 1 − a)) + dx
da
CX (X¯, 1 − a) +
dx¯
da
CX (X, a)
For a deviation from the free trade equilibrium ˛, and replacing a =  ˛ and a¯ = 1 − ˛ total costs
decrease if:
(C˛(X, ˛) − C˛(X¯, 1 − ˛)) + dx
d˛
CX (X¯, 1 − ˛) +
dx¯
d˛
CX (X, ˛) < 0
Dividing through by CX(X, ˛) and changing the sign of the inequality because CX(X, ˛) < 0 the
condition can be written as follows:
C˛(X, ˛) − C˛(X¯, 1 − ˛)
CX (X, ˛)
+ CX (X¯, 1 − ˛)
CX (X, ˛)
dx
d˛
+ dx¯
d˛
> 0

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